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Cameron’s European legacy
How Brexit demonstrates the flawed politics 
of simple solutions
Andrew Glencross
‘To govern is to make believe’, proclaimed Machiavelli. David Cameron 
presumably encountered this dictum while studying Philosophy, Politics 
and Economics at Oxford, but he was unable to put it into practice as 
prime minister. For if the vote for Brexit on 23 June 2016 demonstrated 
anything, it was that a majority of the British electorate did not believe 
what political elites were saying in favour of EU membership. Many in 
the losing camp cried foul, claiming the other lot won by playing fast and 
loose with the truth. Yet fixating on the bucket- load of mendacity on offer 
(from both sides) during the campaign is to miss the wood for the trees. 
Although David Cameron subsequently blamed populism as a sentiment 
fuelled by ‘a movement of unhappiness and concern about the state of 
the world’ (Guardian 2016), the responsibility equally lies much closer 
to home. What made the untruths about Brexit believable was a politics 
of simple solutions promoted by Cameron, which ultimately undid him. 
This damaging legacy will cast a long shadow over British politics as the 
country adapts to life outside the EU and also stands as a stark warning to 
other EU leaders on how not to approach European integration.
Cameron saw an in–out referendum as a straightforward fix to 
internal Conservative Party strife over European integration (Copsey & 
Haughton 2014). When announced in January 2013, it appeared a 
low- risk option since winning a parliamentary majority was far from a 
given. At that time the prime minister was more concerned with quash-
ing Eurosceptic backbenchers’ mischief- making under the coalition 
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agreement with the Liberal Democrats. By 2016, Cameron was perhaps 
entitled to feel confident about his favoured political tactic of managing 
domestic challenges by forcing voters to choose between the status quo 
and an unknown future. He had already won two referendums on this 
basic premise, defeating supporters of the alternative vote (2011) as well 
as partisans of Scottish independence (2014).
In fact, the former prime minister’s rise to the top came on the back 
of an equally simple expedient: he won the party leadership by promising 
to withdraw Tory MEPs from the centre- right grouping in the European 
Parliament. It was a neat way to burnish his Eurosceptic credentials at no 
domestic cost – although Angela Merkel never understood why Cameron 
chose to lose influence in the European Parliament. Disdain for EU 
consensus was also the basis of his fateful renegotiation strategy prior 
to the Brexit vote. Here again he resorted to a simplistic conceit of 
talking tough in the hope it might win concessions sufficient to mollify 
soft Eurosceptics (Glencross 2016).
In reality, the UK’s renegotiated terms of EU membership, 
announced in February 2016, failed to convince the sceptics; meas-
ures to address labour migration, in particular, were abstruse and 
legally uncertain. It was this lacklustre outcome that derailed the sub-
sequent referendum campaign. Cameron had wanted a clear message 
about winning a better deal for the country in a reformed EU. Instead, 
it was the Leave camp that had the simpler, more persuasive policy 
slogan: take back control.
The serried ranks of elites, experts and even foreign leaders such as 
President Obama mobilised by the government should have made short 
work of the less well- funded Leave camp. What only Brexiters could offer, 
though, was a peremptory solution to a multitude of political grievances. 
Brexit was successfully presented as a way to end Brussels’ interference, 
fund the NHS, and reduce immigration. It was not even that EU with-
drawal was always presented as a panacea. Rather, it was the one policy 
option that had never been tried, meaning attempts to discredit its poten-
tial risks were necessarily hypothetical. Voters’ desire to break the mould 
is precisely what populists elsewhere in Europe want to tap into by offer-
ing, as with Beppe Grillo in Italy or Marine Le Pen in France, a referen-
dum on membership of the euro. That is why the UK campaign, and its 
outcome, is of such relevance EU- wide.
As the British government sensed the narrowness of the race, it 
upped the ante with its increasingly gloomy prognoses about the state 
of the UK economy and public finances in the event of Brexit. Thus it 
was not just opponents of EU membership who were engaged in political 
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theatrics. Cameron’s Grand Guignol performance, with economic horror 
at its heart, did little to sway a public sceptical about far more than simply 
the EU. Having bet his political career on the electorate’s status quo bias, 
the politics of simple solutions backfired on him. The reverse suffered was 
not just a personal one. Estimates of constituency- level results reveal that 
63 per cent of UK constituencies returned a majority for the Leave side 
(Hanretty 2016). This amounts to a wholesale disavowal of the country’s 
elected representatives, since only 158 MPs openly declared support for 
leaving the EU (BBC News 2016).
Commentators naturally jumped on the chance to explain this gulf 
between governed and governing. Initial academic analysis focused on 
social inequality as the font of electors’ frustration with the EU and the 
domestic governing class in general (Goodwin & Heath 2016). Portraying 
Brexit as a delayed rejection of neoliberalism by the left- behind of glo-
balisation is certainly a seductive explanation. It confirms the comforting 
premise of social- democracy:  the belief that politics trumps economics 
and that the inequities of capitalism can be corrected eventually once 
voters have had enough of market- driven solutions.
However, what the failure of the Remain campaign truly highlighted 
was the insularity of the British political establishment. The pro- EU side 
either misread or, worse, ignored the warnings from recent referendums 
on European integration. A  litany of rejected deals preceded the UK 
vote: the EU Constitutional Treaty (in two countries), the Lisbon Treaty 
(in Ireland), the Greek bailout and the Ukraine Association Agreement 
(the Netherlands). These examples did more than merely illustrate the 
difficulty of selling the EU status quo. The common thread linking these 
votes was in fact citizens’ refusal to be steamrollered into accepting elite 
nostrums about European cooperation.
Dissatisfaction with Europe is not reducible to an accounting exe r-
cise in which the cons outweigh the pros; it is as much a rejection of the 
animating spirit that there is no alternative to the current institutional 
order. In that sense the EU is – rightly or wrongly – perceived by many 
in Britain and elsewhere as a constraining dystopia. As the Director of 
Hatcheries and Conditioning in Huxley’s Brave New World explains, 
creating a harmonious society requires ‘making people like their ines-
capable social destiny … liking what you’ve got to do’. EU citizens on 
the receiving end of austerity, market liberalisation, and the socioeco-
nomic strains of free movement experience the Single Market as a not- 
so- dissimilar conditioning exercise.
Particularly telling in this regard was the 2015 referendum in which 
Greeks said Oxi (no) to a bailout that a near- unanimity of expert opinion 
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suggested was the only way to remain in the eurozone. The Greek vote 
demonstrated the same lesson as in the UK vote: electors could not be 
cowed into voting out of fear to accept the current EU system as their 
inescapable destiny (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou 2016). Greeks, Brits 
and others have sought to express the right to be unhappy with the 
results that lie behind grandiloquent evocations of European unity and 
prosperity. Direct democracy offers precisely such an opportunity for 
voicing discontent, which is why referendums on EU issues since the 
2005 Constitutional Treaty debacle have had to be handled with such 
caution. Indeed, the passage of the Lisbon Treaty was premised on an 
informal agreement by the European Council to avoid ratification by the 
people (Phinnemore 2013).
But the referendum temptation is hard to resist in a Europe where 
politicians increasingly struggle to rely on representative democracy to 
legitimise their policies. What is convenient about delegating policy- 
making back to the sovereign people is that it allows politicians to 
distance themselves from any negative ramifications that might occur 
further down the line. However, the experience in the EU of using direct 
democracy as a device of empowerment suggests it is of very limited 
value. Where voters have refused to endorse planned treaty change, 
recalcitrant Member States have submitted to re- voting on the same 
treaty, as Ireland has done twice. In other instances, a successor treaty 
has been passed without referendum consultation, as in the case of 
France’s and the Netherlands’ adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. Even in 
situations where a negative vote has led to the obtention of concessions, 
as with the opt- out on asylum and immigration policy Denmark was 
granted after its vote against Maastricht in 1992, the diplomatic pres-
sure to conform with EU norms has greatly diluted the value of these 
concessions (Adler- Nissen 2015a).
The sovereign people in these instances are being short- changed 
when they supposedly exercise their sovereignty. When a popular 
decision has no discernible impact on the status quo, the referendum 
device thus has the opposite effect from that of empowering citizens. 
Such an outcome reveals the flaw in expecting that direct democracy 
can magically compensate for the shortcomings of representative 
democracy. That explains why those with most to lose from referen-
dums are mainstream politicians such as Cameron or Matteo Renzi, 
both of whom made a unilateral resort to direct democracy with the 
objective of sweeping away long- standing problems.
By contrast, it is populist, anti- system parties led by personalities 
such as Nigel Farage, Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen or Beppe Grillo that 
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have the biggest incentive to bypass representative democracy. They 
ostensibly promote rule by the people directly as an alternative to a 
cartelised party politics of both the centre- left and the centre- right that 
allegedly ignores popular concerns. What really matters, however, as 
Jan- Werner Müller (2016b) has explained, is that a referendum offers 
populists a chance for ‘the people to confirm what they have already 
identified as the single authentic will of the people’.
Allowing the people to decide for themselves is nevertheless 
a powerful political message that is hard to ignore, although in the 
British case it was not just external pressure that led Cameron to 
resort to the expedient of direct democracy. Rather, it was a political 
pincer movement. He wanted in part to silence the virulent Eurosceptic 
wing of the Conservative Party that pushed their anti- EU agenda by 
causing parliamentary mischief. At the same time, the other source of 
pressure was the electoral potency of UKIP, whose strategy of spatch-
cocking anti- immigration sentiment with hostility to the EU made 
it the most successful party in the 2014 European elections (Ford & 
Goodwin 2014).
But the appeal to the sovereign people cannot be a replacement 
for representative democracy, because a government is still required to 
exercise sovereignty in the aftermath of any referendum. Nowhere is this 
more obvious than in the case of the UK following the vote on 23 June 
2016. British politicians, like their Greek counterparts in 2015, have had 
to face the consequences that stem from unilateral attempts to resolve 
complex problems of European interdependence.
Cameron’s habit of ruling via easy fixes will have a lasting national 
impact because it leaves those in power at Westminster and Holyrood at 
the mercy of the same forces that cost him his job. In the months after 
the vote, Theresa May and the Scottish first minister counterpart, Nicola 
Sturgeon, became engaged in an ongoing Project Trust  – convincing 
voters they could negotiate the best way out of the Brexit predicament. 
May’s government interpreted the people’s verdict as a call to roll back 
migration from the EU while retaining strong economic ties. Yet the free 
movement of people is a non- negotiable pillar of the Single Market – as 
was made clear to Cameron during the renegotiation. The illusion of 
getting a better deal outside the EU than as a Member State could only 
remain believable until formal exit talks began. That helps explain why 
the government stalled on triggering Article 50 and fought tooth and nail 
to prevent Parliament having a say on the matter.
Meanwhile in Scotland, First Minister Sturgeon toyed with the idea 
of leveraging the 62 per cent majority who supported EU membership 
 
cAMEron’S EUroPEAn lEgAcy 27
  
into a successful independence referendum second time around. Any 
unilateral move of this sort could only succeed if Scots cast aside con-
cerns about oil revenues and the outstanding dilemma of which currency 
an independent Scotland would use (Glencross 2016). Indyref 2.0 would 
in any case mirror the Brexit referendum, becoming a debate centred 
around hypothetical in or out economic scenarios drawing on expert 
forecasting.
Cameron’s flawed EU policy has thus left UK politicians struggling 
to restore the electorate’s confidence in their ability to make the right 
decisions and raised the stakes in case they do not. There is no way of 
knowing beforehand whether Brexit will help or hinder that objective 
across the UK. What is clear is that – except for blaming EU hostility if 
a speedy free trade deal cannot be agreed alongside Article 50 negotia-
tions – there are no simple solutions left.
Ironically, the political mess occasioned by Brexit might have a posi-
tive impact on the EU at a time of ever- growing populism. Despite certain 
predictions to the contrary, there was no immediate domino- effect of 
other governments pledging to hold referendums on leaving. Seen from 
Europe, British politics in the months after the referendum appeared 
mostly in a chaotic and cacophonous state as government ministers made 
claims and counter- claims about preferred outcomes or strategies. That 
compares negatively with the measured statements of leaders across the 
EU that the four fundamental freedoms cannot be cherry- picked. This 
show of unity in a time of crisis is not so common.
More importantly, as revealed by a Bertelsmann survey in the 
aftermath of the British vote, the difficulties facing the UK seem 
to have reinforced voters’ belief in the importance of the EU and its 
Single Market (Financial Times 2016a). The complexity and risks 
associated with unravelling the UK’s EU membership offer an object 
lesson to European voters in the limitations of simplistic policy solu-
tions. Contradictions that before existed merely in theory, such as the 
UK having to renegotiate free trade deals with countries for which 
there was already an EU one, become of practical relevance to vot-
ers. In this fashion, Brexit may potentially re- affirm European solidar-
ity  – at a time of great self- doubt  – by highlighting once and for all 
exactly what would be lost without European integration. It is not that 
Euroscepticism or Europessimism, especially that occasioned by aus-
terity within the eurozone, will disappear. That said, anti- EU populism 
prospered by claiming elites were too blinkered to see the benefits of 
reclaiming sovereignty. The throes of Britain’s attempt to ‘take back 
control’ from Europe could finally reverse this narrative.
